Why LEOs Should Understand Case Law
Just as laws provide the framework for a functioning society, case law provides the fabric through which legislators and society carry out those laws. Law enforcement officers will interact with citizens, regardless of the societal norms established by the legislative branch. Accordingly, the officers and agency’s performance in assisting with public safety and service must pass constitutional and statutory muster. In other words, law enforcement agencies are held up to, and scrutinized by, case law.
Judicial decisions, as interpreted in cases by judges, constantly define the contours by which police practices and governmental processes are determined. In determining the breadth and scope of police authority , accepted case law has been hashed out; litigation has gone all the way up the courts’ hierarchy; and doctrines have been created, applied, and evolved.
While case law is not static, it is ultimately used to determine what the law is. That is the conundrum of case law: it evolves, but it ultimately determines the law as established by those who are supposed to know best. Further, case law is not merely theoretical or academic. It is real-world settled understandings that affect everyone who interacts with the judicial system, particularly those within the criminal justice system. Case law is often the final say regarding what is legally permissible, and creates binding authority that all must follow until it is overturned.
Your Right to Remain Silent in Miranda v. Arizona
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) is one of the most important U.S. Supreme Court cases. In Miranda, the Court set forth requirements that law enforcement must follow before any custodial interrogation may occur. The Phoenix Police Department uses Miranda warnings as a routine and integral part of its monthly training for all of its officers. Given the reputation of the Miranda decision, many officers respond in surprise when it is suggested that Miranda does not actually require a specific warning. Nevertheless, the main takeaway from Miranda is that as a law enforcement officer, you are required to inform your subject that they have a right to remain silent at the time of the custodial interrogation. This is the fundamental constitutional requirement of Miranda.
Terry v Ohio: The Stop and Frisk
Law enforcement officers conduct investigatory stops and "stop and frisks" every day. But do you know when searches and seizures cross the line, converting a stop into an unlawful arrest? Terry v. Ohio has established limits on stops, under what circumstances officers can conduct a "frisk", and when officers must act as if they should have known that their actions were unlawful. That limits are often crossed can subject departments to devastating, costly lawsuits.
Because of its near-universal application, Terry is one of the most important cases that law enforcement officers should know, and certainly it is one of the top 10 cases that every officer should know. That’s worth emphasizing: EVERY officer that works patrol or other fields involving street stops needs to know Terry v. Ohio. Anything short of that is not doing your job right. Cops who don’t know Terry are not doing their jobs properly, because they are acting without education about the limits placed on them by the Supreme Court. This was one of the main points in the recent Fox43 News report about the case. It was billed as a scandal at the federal level, but I see it as something that should be taught at every police academy in the country.
The Supreme Court tackled the issue of unreasonable search and seizures in TERRY v. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). John W. Terry was convicted of illegal carrying of a concealed weapon. On appeal, he challenged his arrest, contending that under the Fourth Amendment, the police lacked probable cause to stop and arrest him.
The crime was conspicuous: Terry and two other men walked a block up and down a sidewalk apparently casing a storefront. A policeman, McFadden, suspected Terry and one of his companions to be about to commit an armed robbery so he approached the men and asked them for identification. The men mumbled and did not turn toward the officer, responding only when the officer demanded a second and third time that they identify themselves. The officer then decided that the men were up to no good and decided to perform a "frisk" for weapons. He claimed that one of the men had a gun in his pocket, but he performed a search of both Terry and his companion, even though McFadden saw no sign that Terry was armed. He found that the other man was carrying a gun in his pocket.
The Supreme Court considered whether the initial stop was illegal, and if the subsequent arrest was legal. The court concluded that the stop was "an important and necessary precaution for the protection of the policeman justifies the protective search for weapons which we approve. (emphasis added)" Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
The court concluded that an officer making a "brief investigatory stop of a person upon reasonable suspicion" that he is involved in criminal activity, "to determine whether or not the suspicion is well-founded," does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
The court addressed the standard for what constitutes reasonable suspicion: an officer does not need probable cause to suspect that a person is involved in criminal activity. "Reasonable suspicion" becomes "probable cause" when the officer actually sees evidence of criminal activity.
The court acknowledged that the mere presence of two men on a "felt uninhabited sidewalk in a high crime area," does not justify a stop even if the behavior is unusual. "Officer McFadden’s limited initiative in this case was justifiable…at no point during the officer’s encounter with these petitioners did he harass or intimidate them. He was entitled to ask them for identification and to ask them what they were doing. He was permitted, on the basis of their responses, or absence of response, to pat down each for weapons. Under the circumstances, the limitation which he imposed on the invasion of these petitioners’ personal security was reasonable and hence acceptable." Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
The court defined the constitutional violation that occurred as an "unreasonable intrusion upon personal security." In this case, the standard was mechanical and factual. McFadden followed the rules: he had a reasonable suspicion, and did not dig deeper than necessary. The actual stop and search was fine, but because he did not have reasonable suspicion of Terry possessing a weapon, it became unreasonable and unconstitutional.
Terry establishes that cops have a duty to ask questions in the course of an investigation. He also says that if you have reasonable suspicion of a crime by the suspect, you can conduct a brief "frisk" of the area immediately around the suspect. Terry’s instructions regarding when you have reasonable suspicion are clear, and they must be applied mechanically and uniformly. They create a duty to investigate.
The question to consider is why so many cops apply Terry so differently than it is laid out in the case: the cop in the news report was not following Terry, McFadden was following Terry’s law.
Mapp v. Ohio: The Exclusionary Rule
In Mapp v. Ohio the Court ruled that police officers could not go into any place without a warrant, including you house. In the case the police had received information about possible gambling activity at the Someplace Else bar in Cleveland which was owned by Appellant Mapp’s father. The officers went to Mapp’s house and asked her to come with them and show them the premises where the gambling was taking place. They did not have a search warrant and refused her request to call an attorney, but she went anyway. When the officers arrived at the bar, Mapp and the officers argued about their right to search the premises for gambling activities. The officers then returned to Mapp’s house and asked to search it. Mapp denied the request and did not allow them to enter. The officers left but returned in full force a short time later, again without a warrant. Mapp told the officers to wait until her lawyer arrived before they searched. The officers continued to pound on the door, shouting ‘Police officers with a warrant for your arrest.’ Once Mapp’s lawyer arrived, the door was opened and the officers entered the house and conducted a search. The officers found a small box, which they opened without a warrant, and discovered what was later determined to be obscene materials. The Ohio court upheld the seizure and the defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed finding the seizure unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed that the evidence of the obscene materials should have been excluded and held that the exclusionary rule was now applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. This case greatly extended the exclusionary rule to state courts in regards to evidence acquired via unreasonable searches and seizures. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends to the states the exclusionary rules for unreasonable search and seizures articulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court concluded that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No changes in the legal principles by which the Fourth Amendment is applied are necessary to give it application against the states. Exclusionary rules applied to the states to insure a fair trial.
Graham v. Connor: Use of Force
The Reasonableness of the Force Used in Plaintiff’s Arrest
… The Court also rejected the City’s argument that Graham was "trespassing under the guise of being drunk and must assume the risk of damaging another person’s property." Rather, the court stated that "[i]f the damage was caused by excessive force rather than drunkenness, the city should not be indemnified." This case also set forth a standard for evaluation of the reasonableness of police use of force which has been used by many courts across the country which is "whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The Court stated that:
"This ‘objective reasonableness’ standard recognizes that officers are often forced to make split-second decisions — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . Given the set of objective circumstances confronting [officers] when they made the split-second decision at issue, would the officers’ decision to use deadly force have appeared reasonable to a reasonable officer on the scene? This ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, while it relies upon the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, must nonetheless be judged against the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time in question. In judging the objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions, [courts] must take into account the reality that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989). This "objective reasonableness" standard, explicitly adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, has been incorporated and embraced by other courts including in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Martinez v. City of Discovery Bay, 2016 WL 6803766 (4th Dist., Nov. 17, 2016, no. D069790) [nonpub. opn.].
Case Law on Search and Seizure
Many lawyers commonly use the term "settled law" to describe binding case law. The phrase "settled law" is often used to describe one or more cases that control a certain area of constitutional or statutory interpretation. Therefore, if you do not know a key "settled law" case on an issue you may be shocked when a judge reprimands you for not knowing the law.
Below is a list of important case law every law enforcement officer should know:
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969) A police officer can stop and question a person on the street even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. A "stop" stops short of a full-scale arrest. A "stop" must be based on a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot."
Briggs v. Burton, 282 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2002) It is unreasonable for an officer to stop a person for a parole search on the basis of a witness report that the person was armed and robbing a person at gunpoint without a description of the person.
Tatum v. City & County of Santa Barbara, 406 F. 3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) Officers, who overstepped constitutional bounds by detaining a resident of a mobile home park without reasonable suspicion that the resident was committing a crime or probation violation, were entitled to qualified immunity against a suit under § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) Police officers may not conduct a protective search of a person solely because he is in a location where a search warrant is being executed. An officer may, however, conduct a protective search during the execution of a warrant based on a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) Consensual use of a radio transmitter by a drug courier after a search warrant for narcotics had been issued and executed was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it led to a substantial amplification of the government’s investigation and a significant additional invasion of privacy.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) A dog sniff, occurring contemporaneously with an otherwise lawful traffic stop, does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not change the nature or scope of the stop.
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) An unconsented search of a driver’s purse found in a garbage bag left in the trunk of a car after lawfully arresting the driver was valid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the driver had relinquished her privacy interest in purse when she "voluntarily abandoned it," which occurred when it was seized from the driver’s vehicle in the course of a lawful arrest. No reasonable expectation of privacy existed because defendant could not have reasonably expected that it was not going to be searched.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) An alert of a properly trained narcotics dog is sufficient to establish probable cause for a search.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) The search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment no longer applies to cell phones generally. With respect to the officers’ safety the search incident to arrest exception is inapplicable to cell phones.
How Recent Case Law Affects LEOs
Along the same lines, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana provided further insight into the requirements for a motor vehicle stop. In United States v. Smith, the court reflected on the changes brought on by the Rodriguez ruling and limited what may be considered probable cause for a seizure to evidence of a drug crime. The court concluded that the odor of burnt marijuana in an individual’s vehicle alone was not enough to establish probable cause for a traffic stop if the passenger in the vehicle is not observed with the marijuana.
Ongoing case law analysis remains important in the current climate. The Supreme Court has recently accepted new cases addressing the issue of police officers’ use of body cameras, which may greatly affect police practices. In City and County of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan, and Mendez v. County of Los Angeles , the court will address issues surrounding the use of videos and disabling body cameras and how it affects Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Several other important Fourth Amendment and search and seizure case law developments have occurred as well. The Graham circumstance rule has further evolved. The Graham rule dictates whether or not the use of force was reasonable in size and magnitude. Several courts have applied the rule in situations where there was no arrest, but a vehicle was stopped because it appeared to be speeding when the speed limit was actually increased. The courts have found that the quick increase of speed was not an arrest but merely the officers "turning on his lights."
Another Fourth Amendment search and seizure case that may be of particular interest to law enforcement is Michigan v. Long where the Supreme Court held that a "protective sweep" can be expanded beyond the immediate area of concern, however, the expansion must be a specific area within the immediate area.